> This post and and the jb "essentially a one-time pad" notion, rather
> 'universal one-time pad' notion are interesting...
> Rabin said the math to prove his discovery is 'hard'. The one-time pad
> solution has been proven secure, under the assumption pads are not
> compromised. Is it really that hard to prove that a time-stamped stream of
> non-repeating random bits is the same as a universal one-time pad and that
> said pad cannot be compromised?
I haven't tried to prove this formally, but as you imply this doesn't seem like
rocket science. I suppose the trickiness involved here would be in proving the
security of sharing a sampling schedule. I'm not sure how one would go about
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Fri Apr 27 2001 - 23:18:00 PDT