The end of liberty
Mon, 01 Oct 2001 18:46:24 -0600
At 10/1/01 12:23 PM, Jeff Bone wrote:
>Marty Halvorson wrote:
> > How does this work when potentially dangerous individuals can change their
> > "apparent" identification very easily?
>Fake IDs may get you into bars when you're 19 y/o but they're usually not
>adequate to fool trained security or law enforcement officers. No need for
>DNA, fingerprints, etc... just checking *everyone's* ID *well* at the
>departure would be a vast improvement.
The folks who crashed the planes had a least one ID belonging to someone
else. Worked just as well for them as it does to get into bars. All they
needed was the ID belonging to someone with a reasonable
resemblance. Didn't even need to fake an ID.
As long as the ID presented fulfills the requirements, e.g., the photo on
the ID looks like the person presenting it, I don't see how checking
"everyone's ID real well" is going to help. Before 911 the agent at the
gate or ticket counter compared my ID photo with me every time I flew. I
don't see how your suggestion will work without biometric data on the ID,
that's checkable against the person presenting that ID. Even then it's
only a matter of time before someone figures out how to fake the "new" ID
For example, there was a case in New Mexico a couple of years ago where a
smart kid was selling ID's to his friends. This was just after New Mexico
had instituted holograms covering the photo, to make them "counterfeit
proof". True enough, they couldn't stand up to "real" close scrutiny, but
they worked quite well for quite a few kids. I claim that if a kid can
make an acceptable counterfeit using his home PC, a professional can make
one that would fool a security guard at the airport.
New Mexico Supreme Court
Administrative Office of the Court
Judicial Information Division