Greg Bolcer gbolcer at
Fri Jan 9 07:54:55 PST 2004

In 1941 Marshall and Stark signed a joint memorandum in that the basic
US military US-UK agreement would remain sound and that military
action against Japan should only be undertaken in one or more of
several contingencies.  These include a Japanese movement against
the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British
Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies.  Japan had delivered
to the US an ultimatum which ended in failure on November 19th.  The
Japanese ambassador later pleaded for further time, three or four days,
ending in the 29th.   On the 24th, the US had an intercept stating that
the deadline was in Japanese time and the US War Cabinet including
Marshall and Stimson met at the whitehouse where they discussed
the possibility of being attacked as soon as next Monday, December 1st
in an attack without warning.   The question was, knowing the Japanese
naval fleet was out roaming in the pacific, should the US pre-emptively
fire the first shot without too much danger to ourselves.  On Novermber 26th,
without consultation from his War cabinet, Roosevelt instructed Hull to
hand an ultimatum to the Japanese that they would not accept.  In true
pontius pilot liturgy, Hull told Simpson that he had washed his hand
of it and the US military.  More than a week before the December 7th
attacks, a message was sent to MacArthur using Marshall's signature
and to Hawaii warnign of imminent attack of the Burma road in Thailand,
the Netherlands East Indies, the Phillipines, and the Russian maritime
provinces.  Reports of a Japanese expeditonary force reaching the
Phillipines crossed Roosevelt's desk.  It was concluded that if this
25,000 man Japanese troop force were to round the southern point
of Indochina it could be an irrevocable loss of strategic advantage 
necessitating preventive action.   On December 3rd, the Japanese Navy
was closing in, but on what target?   The US ambassadors destroyed their
code machines and later on December 5th they also destroyed their UK
ones.  The US intercepted a coded message to Mussolini asking if
Japan declared war on the US and Britain, would Italy immediately
do likewise?  Mussolini replied, "of course".  More alarming was Admiral
Stark's report that the Japanese fleet had crossed the failsafe line.  That
Saturday, the US cryptography team had been summoned to be on high
alert to immediately decode and translate any messages to accelerate to
the president.  Late that night on the 6th, Marshall and Stark were put on
notice by Roosevelt and told to come in early on Sunday.  Testimonies of
subordinates put him in the office as early as 9am.  Later congressional
testimony questioned whether the US should have pre-emptively
used military force against the Japanese Navy or strategic points and/or
there should have not been an "nationwide" alert which may have
prevented some number of thousands of military deaths.  
I think that the grieving widow Ellen Mariani has gotten past her denial stage, has
a long history of writing open letters in anger, and by filing a lawsuit
hopes to enter into a bargaining stage.   Let's hope her depression is
short lived and her acceptance stage leads to a healthy recovery.   

	-----Original Message----- 
	From: fork-bounces at on behalf of Geege 
	Sent: Fri 1/9/2004 6:00 AM 
	To: fork 
	Subject: naked
	complaint filed against the bush admin.
	ta ta,
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