[FoRK] Poisoned DNS and informal certificates

[silky]

On Wed, Feb 20, 2008 at 10:04 PM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 20, 2008 at 08:46:28PM +1100, silky wrote:
>
>  > eh? what does transistor price have to to with otp? otp is about a
>  > secure channel upfront, where the otp can be distributed, not but any
>  > sort of processing power.
>
>  Storage area on smartcards. Notice I never claimed one-time pads
>  are a smart idea, given mature state of the art in simple public-key
>  authentication smartcards.

what does storage area have to do with OTP? I still don't see why you
think transistors help with OTP. they just need a second channel to
deliver it to you with. but then the problem is how do you avoid
typing that into an insecure place? with the email plan, you don't
type you click. with sms you do type, so you can type it in the wrong
(mitm) site.



>  Almost every bank herabouts issues teller cards as smart cards.
>  For whatever reason, they don't issue matching readers with display
>  and keypad. Instead, they choose to spam me with warnings in
>  BOLD RED LETTERS to not enter the PIN/TAN (ironically, a one-time
>  pad) on their web banking interface, if you think something is phishy
>  (Tee-hee! End user should diagnose malware infestation. Yeah, sure).
>
>
>  >
>  >
>  > > But, there's no need, smartcards + secure readers
>  > > can't be compromised.
>  >
>  > it can if the implementation is complex. which it is. anyway, to say
>
>  Would you hire a developer who can't get a trivial embedded application
>  (USB smartcard reader + PIN pad + display) right?

but what if the smartcard/auth system itself is broken? that's what
i'm referring to.


> I mean, we've got
>  very low standards already, and they're slipping still, but, surely,
>  we can't steep that low? Or can we?
>
>  Smartcards are COTS.
>
>
>  > it "can't be compromised" is not very wise. it's better to discuss the
>
>  Are you familiar with cryptographic smartcard applications, and
>  external, hardened cryptographic transaction compartments?

i've forgotten a bit know, but just because it's quite effective now
doesn't mean it will remain that way. and it also doesn't mean you
should call it 'uncompromised' and hence not consider further
redundancies.


>  > ways in which it is secure. you can't predict what will happen in the
>  > future, only what security it currently provides.
>
>  Does this mean you think smartcard-authenticated and industry-standard
>  encrypted transactions can be more easily attacked than unsecured endusers
>  PCs?

hmm, now what argument pattern is this called? strawman? yes.


>  --
>  Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
>  ______________________________________________________________
>  ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
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A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is it such a bad thing?
A: Top-posting.
Q: What is the most annoying thing on usenet and in e-mail?