[FoRK] Extreme Life Extension: Investing in Cryonics for the Long, Long Term

Jebadiah Moore jebdm at jebdm.net
Mon Jun 21 19:37:17 PDT 2010

On Mon, Jun 21, 2010 at 9:30 PM, silky <michaelslists at gmail.com> wrote:

> True, but I am trying to understand how the me that is looking at the
> computer me could reconcile what has happened. Which one would "I" be?
> The one that is typing this now? Would I be the human, or the
> computer, or both? Or none? Would the human me be sad at my impending
> death? Or comfortable because the computer me would live on? Clearly,
> I would expect the human me to be sad and concerned, because he would
> have different memories, and thus a different identity. I'm suggesting
> that one of the two would need to die as the copy is made, otherwise
> continuity of the singular person wouldn't be complete. Ideally, death
> of the former would be a direct result of creation of the latter, via
> some sort of entanglement process ...

Both versions (the original and the copy) would feel like they were the same
"you" as before the copy.  The "you" before the copy wouldn't exist at this
point in time, so he wouldn't feel anything.  The human you would probably
feel roughly the same about death as before, though it might be a comfort to
know there is another near-perfect copy there to be with your loved
ones/carry on your legacy/etc.

The only reason it might be advantageous for the human original to die in
the process is to ensure that there isn't a strange computer version who is
almost identical, except for the difference in experience from the point of
copying on.  There are possible solutions to this--for example, monitor the
senses and feed identical input to the copy.

Jebadiah Moore

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