[FoRK] Privacy? Obama doesn't think so...
Stephen D. Williams
sdw at lig.net
Sun Jun 27 14:50:06 PDT 2010
On 6/27/10 1:56 PM, Reese wrote:
> On 27-Jun-10 15:30, Stephen D. Williams wrote:
>> On 6/27/10 10:50 AM, Jeff Bone wrote:
>>> Stephen says "eh."
>> Technically, I said: "Maybe 'eh', maybe 'Oh no!'. What was proposed in
>> that document by the administration could be nothing but good, depending
>> on integrity of implementation.
> But there's the rub. Even if it is implemented perfectly, the next
> government bureaucrat with oversight can turn it on its ear. Best
> to keep such things off of the books in the first place. Or explicitly
> prohibit them.
That document mainly endorsed an identity and trust ecosystem somewhat
more complete and organized than the one we have with individual,
business, and government acceptance. Unless you want to destroy what we
have now, re: credit unions / criminal background checks / SSN /
driver's license / PKI certificates for people and web sites and
government users / etc., it is hard to see how extending that a bit is
totally wrong. Potentially too far or abused, sure.
You want to avoid a police state, avoid malicious hacking of individuals
or fraud, and prevent any abuse of people by someone in power based on
anything but breaking the law in significant ways. You do however want
to know who's renting your house, working for you, running your nuclear
reactor, etc. You want to know that you can find the guy who just gave
you a check or worked on your car. That you are going to get that big
ticket item you just paid for over the Internet. And you don't want to
have to bring a copy of every document you have with every bit of
personal, and highly exploitable, information to do any of those
transactions. A key goal of that paper was to finish creating a system
where you could supply what was necessary (yes, I am 18 / 21, yes, I am
a US citizen, ...) without revealing more information. You cannot do
that in a completely anarchic system. That was the part I found
interesting: Getting a trusted attribute from a trusted attribute
provider based on provable identity in a way that didn't reveal anything
else is potentially very useful. Using indirect methods, which exist to
some extent now, the receiver never gets your actual identity at all.
That could be the government not getting your actual ID from your
commercial representative, a perfectly reasonable and possible outcome.
Already, the government uses commercial systems and methods for commerce
and reviewing trustworthiness of citizens.
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